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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
32. THE EFFECTS OF MANDATING BENEFITS PACKAGES
Olivia S. Mitchell
CornellUniversityand
NationalBureauof EconomicResearch
Research Findings:
This paper identifies and, where possible, quantifies potential labor market
consequences of government mandates of employee benefits. Policy analysts should
consider two questions when contemplating mandated benefits: (1) What relative
imponance should be attached to those who gain under the mandate versus those who lose?
(2) Could feasible alternative policies have more beneficial outcomes? Existing policy
research suggests the following conclusions:
Mandating benefits will increase benefit coverage and generosity for
numerous workers and their families. Nevenheless, many people lacking insurance
.
coverage will not be helped by this type of mandated employee benefit program.
. Even when mandating benefits does improve benefit provision, there will be
offsetting effects. These include wage and other benefit cuts, reduced work hours,reduced
employment, and possibly output reductions in covered sectors. Employer bias against
"expensive to insure" workers may also result, producing labor market sorting and
segmentation.
Most workers currently without benefit coverage are employees of small
firms, women, pan-time and minimum wage workers. Nevenheless, most mandated
.
benefit proposals exclude or reduce coverage for these workers to alleviate the financial
burden on small firms.
Policy Recommendations:
While mandating benefits using a fixed-cost structure is viewed positively
by some, it raises labor costs most for low-wage workers, inducing substitution away from
.
them toward more skilled employees. Fixed-cost benefits also reduce flexibility in
designing benefit packages and are not responsive to worker and firm differences in the
demand for benefits. In contrast, a variable-cost format where benefits accrue according to
hours worked somewhat mitigates these drawbacks.
Many finns claim they require tax incentives to help them provide benefit
coverage. If tax incentives become necessary for political reasons, they should be paired
.
with a cap on the overall fraction of payroll that can be used for tax-shielded employee
benefit contributions. This would make the tax and the benefit system more equitable as a
whole.
If government decides to mandate more employee benefits, a gradual
approach should be taken. Each element of a target mandated benefit package should be
.
ranked in a priority list and justified on both efficiency and equity grounds. Specifically,
requiring coverage for catastrophic health costs provides coverage for losses that most
threaten the low-income workforce, and has fewer negative cost consequences than the
more expensive plans currently before Congress. Subsequently, after the labor market
consequences of one such benefit are evaluated, additional benefit mandates might be
considered.
A separate approach should be designed to meet the needs of those not
covered by mandated benefit programs.
.
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The purpose of this paper is to inform policymakers and the public about the
potential labor market consequences of government mandating of employee benefits. Both
theoretical and empirical economic arguments for and against benefit mandating are
presented and assessed. In.view of the continuing policy debate over health care and
parental leave, these two areas are the focus of special attention in the discussion below.
It should be stated at the outset that the paper's objective is to evaluate rather than to
support or undermine policy proposals to mandate benefits for US workers. First we
examine the role of employee benefits in the US labor market, seeking to explain why some
firms and workers are less likely to have particular benefits, or have less generous benefits,
as compared to others. Next, we discuss several rationales for mandating benefits,
presenting the pros and cons from an economic policy viewpoint. Having established the
policy context, the third part of the paper then outlines the likely effect of mandating
benefits on key labor market outcomes. Available evidence from related literature is
provided, and where possible special problems specific to small firms are emphasized. A
final section summarizes and offers specific policy recommendations that should be
considered when designing a mandatory benefits package. We also identify important
remaining research questions for the benefits fields and describe the data necessary to
address these.1
I. Understanding Why Employee Benefit Coverage is Uneven
Broadlydefined,an employeebenefit is any form of nonwagecompensation. In
this paper we narrow our focus to what is conventionally termed "voluntarily-provided
benefits" which include payments in kind such as employer-provided group life, health and
disability insurance programs; deferred compensation, primarily in the form of company-
sponsored pensions and other retirement savings vehicles; and more recent arrivals to the
benefit scene such as subsidized child care arrangements, health spas, legal assistance in
divorces and house closings, and flexible (cafeteria) benefits, among others. All told,
voluntarily provided benefits constitute 25-30% of private sector payrolls. This category of
benefits must be distinguished from "legally required" benefits mandated by law and
funded through special payroll taxes (e.g. Social Security, Workers' Compensation,
Unemployment Insurance); these latter comprise roughly 10% of private sector
compensation. Company contributions for both types of benefits have grown steadily over
time until the last five year, when employer benefit outlays have moderated somewhat
(Andrews, 1988; Woodbury, 1989).
There are marked differences in the distribution of voluntarily provided benefits
across workers and firms. For instance, a unionized male worker with a long-term and
full-time attachment to his job is far more likely to have life and health insurance coverage
and a pension plan, as compared to a lower-wage female worker, or a black employee, or a
short-term or part-time worker. Researchers have also documented the fact that large firms
tend to offer more nonwage benefits and a wider variety of such benefits than do small
firms (Andrews, 1989;Frumkin, 1986;Bell and Marclay, 1987). For instance, over 80% of
small as well as medium and large firms offer paid vacation time, but the prevalence of
health and retirement coverage is much smaller among firms with fewer than one hundred
employees, as compared to larger firms (see Table 1).
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Retirement /Pension 91% 43%
Health Insurance 96 75
Life Insurance 96 59
Paid Time Off
Vacations 99 81
Paid Lunch Break 10 19
Sick Leave 67 26
Disability Insurance (Long tenn) 48 26
Other
Educational Assistance 76 23
Employee Discoun~s 57 35
Child Care 1 4
Table 1
Fraction of Full-time Employees Participating
in Company Benefit Plans by Firm Size (1987)
Benefit Plan
Fraction of Employees Participating in Benefit Plan in:
Medium & Large Finns Small Finns
Note: Medium and large finns are those classified as having 100-250 employees,
depending on the industry. Small finns are classified as those with fewer than 100
employees.
Source: Andrews, 1988.
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This pervasive unevenness in benefit coverage is partly a reflection of worker and
finn differences in their valuation of employee benefits. High-wage employees value
benefits which permit them to shelter compensation from tax: for instance, if an employer
picks up a $2000 health insurance premium, this health benefit is currently not taxable
while the equivalent in cash incQme would be subject to Federal, state, and Social Security
tax.2 Similarly, pension contributions and investment earnings on those contributions are
tax-free until retirement, when the individual will be in a lower tax bracket. Hence one
reason employee benefits are more prevalent among higher-paid workers is that they shield
some compensation from higher marginal tax brackets.
There are additional reasons that workers value non-wage benefits in the
compensation package. Some employee benefits are designed to help workers accumulate
funds that they might otherwise be tempted to spend (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). Insurance
costs are also lower among larger groups of people due to scale economies, administrative
cost savings, and risk pooling, making group provision of benefits especially appealing
(Mitchell and Andrews, 1981). Insurers prefer to work with groups formed for purposes
other than the purchase of insurance to avoid unusual expenses due to adverse selection, so
that employee groups have a special advantage in this regard (Beam and McFadden, 1988).
One explanation for why union workers have employee benefits is that labor unions appear
more responsive to older and stable employees' demands (Freeman, 1981). Putting all these
factors together, it seems clear that part of the unevenness in benefit coverage across the
working population is due to a concentration of worker demand among high-wage and
unionized employees in large firms. Conversely, demand for benefits has been the lowest
among low-wage workers for whom the tax shield is worth less, and for whom the need
for cash compensation is the greatest}
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Another reason that benefit coverage is not universal in the US labor market is that
companies differ in the way they perceive the value of employee benefits. Some employers
are indifferent between devoting a given sum to wages, say $1000, versus allocating the
same sum of $1000 to non-wage benefits: in both cases the expenditure is treated as labor
cost and deductible as a business expense. On the other hand, Mumy (1985) finds that
some companies perceive benefit expenditures as being wonh "more" since contributions
reduce payroll taxes such as Social Security and Workers' Compensation payments. In
addition, firms also use benefit packages to achieve cenain employment objectives:
deferred compensation attracts stable workers, pensions are structured to induce early
retirement, health insurance plans are tailored to attract and retain cenain types of workers,
and child-care subsidies !pay be offered to reduce absenteeism and turnover (Gustman and
Steinmeier, 1989;Mitchell, 1982;Sindelar, 1982; EBRI 1989). Firms also structure stock
ownership and profit-sharing benefit plans to induce more productivity and serve as a work
incentive tool (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1986) More complex analyses have also
identified the fact that corporations alter their benefit plans so as to enhance their balance
sheets and meet overall corporate goals (Bulow, 1982; Ippolito, 1986).
In overview then, surveys confirm that benefits and wages appear in different
mixes from one firm to the next. Labor market research contends that this is the result of
differences in employees' demands for benefits, interacting with employers' differential
willingness to provide benefits of various kinds. Dollars devoted to benefits come at the
expense of dollars that could have gone to wages, though the exact degree of
substitutability between the various forms of compensation will vary from one workplace
to another.
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II. Mandatinl: Employee Benefits: The Policy Context
The unevendistributionof employeebenefitsin the US labormarket has for many
years generated controversy among labor analysts. Some argue that no intervention in the
market is justified, believing that cross-sectional benefit differences are simply the natural
outgrowth of differences in firms', workers', and labor unions' valuation of nonwage
compensation (Becker, 1988). Others take issue with this conclusion, suggesting instead
that the government should influence or even dictate which benefits should be provided as
well as who should receive them. In this section we examine several rationales for and
against government intervention in the employee benefit arena, with the goal being an
assessment of the issues which must be considered in making sensible government policy.
To clarify arguments, we organize the discussion around two questions: (1) When,
if at all, should the government intervene in firms' and workers' election of nonwage
compensation such as health or life insurance, pension, or other benefits? and (2) What are
the pros and cons of having the government mandate that firms provide nonwage benefits,
on the assumption that there is a rationale for government intervention? Each question is
taken up in turn.
When, if at all, should the government intervene in firm's and workers'
election of nonwage benefits?
Analysts of different political and economic persuasions arrive at very different
conclusions about the need for government involvement in benefits provision. We begin
by evaluating various rationales offered to justify government intervention in the nonwage
benefits area, and then go on to do the same for arguments against the proposition.
One motivation for government involvement in the benefits area is paternalism.
Supporters identify a list of "merit goods" or "minimum labor standards" and contend that
6
all should be covered by these; the next step is to argue that the government must require
that these be provided "even if the members of the society do not demand them" (Rosen,
1985; p. 64). Inevitably there is disagreement about which items should and do fall into
the merit good category. One merit good about which there is relatively little debate at
present in the United States is public education, which the government requires (virtually)
all school-age children to consume. However in the benefits context there is far more
disagreement If "health" is identified as a merit good, it then follows that healthcare
insurance is a benefit to which the government must guarantee access. On the other hand,
good health is an elusive concept and insurance expensive. Funhermore, calling something
a merit good "is not really a justification for (public) suppon -- it merely invests a bit of
terminology to designate the desire to do so" (Baumol and Baumol, cited by Rosen, 1985,
p. 65). In shon, the merit good argument does not stand on economic grounds as a
rationale for a government benefit mandate. On the other hand analysts recognize that there
are other philosophical and perhaps ethical reasons to suppon (and to oppose) the proposal.
A different justification for government intervention in the provision of benefits
stems from information problems. Specifically, when workers and/or firms are poorly
informed of the imponant advantages versus costs of nonwage benefits, they will demand
suboptimal levels of such benefits as compared to what would be socially efficient. This
may arise, for instance, when people fail to buy health insurance because they are not
aware of possibly catastrophic medical costs or cannot accurately judge the long term
consequences of not having the insurance coverage. A similar case might be made for
family or child care benefits: prior to having children, most people are probably unaware
of their future demand for parental leave and high-quality childcare. Another example
arises from the fact that even highly educated workers misestimate their expected lifespans
(Hamermesh, 1979);as a consequence they will tend to make incorrect retirement savings
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plans. In such cases, the most clear-cut role for government is to rectify the information
gaps where possible by publicizing relevant risks and costs (Mitchell, 1988). In unusual
cases when information problems are not easily corrected, the government may perceive a
need to require benefit coverage directly. Interestingly, no research has yet shown that this
is a serious problem in the health care or family leave area.
A third rationale for government intervention in the benefits arena is externalities.
The best-known example in a non-benefit context arises when one individual's purchase of
an immunization injection has a direct effect on the health of those around him or her, but
that person's decision to obtain the injection typically does not recognize how his or her
immunity benefits the rest of society. Requiring all to become immunized is justified by
proponents of this view, recognizing that only in this way will the optimal amount of health
care be consumed. (Even in this case, however, critics of immunization programs have
argued that costs exceed benefits). The externality argument is also used to rationalize
government intervention in the unemployment insurance area, by arguing that VI is
necessary to force firms to internalize layoff costs they otherwise might not pay for
(Ehrenberg and Schumann, 1982).
Similar externalities arise in the medical care area. When someone stays in the
hospital longer or consumes more medical care than medically necessary simply because
health insurance picks up the bulk of the tab, that individual is imposing higher medical
care costs on others. A related problem arises because the medically indigent are frequently
subsidized by taxpayers and private insurers (pauly, 1988). Here the externalities are
negative, since indigent peoples' demand for health care is met by hospitals and medical
practitioners who then are forced to raise prices for those with health insurance coverage.
Recently supponers of parental leave bills have offered similar justifications for their
proposals: for instance Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-Conn) recently argued that insufficient
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maternal leave imposes costs on society later in the form of greater need for remedial
education (Bureau of National Affairs, 1989). In such instances an appropriate role for
government may be to alter incentives so that individual decisions about how much to
demand and supply incorporate spillover effects on others.
A fourth rationale for government intervention in the benefits area is that sometimes
private markets are unable to provide insurance coverage very effectively or cheaply. For
instance, adverse selection makes it prohibitively expensive for the chronically ill to obtain
low-cost health insurance on their own. However if risks of poor health could be pooled
over a large enough group, and if people agreed to precommit to such insurance before
their adult health status was fully known, the risk spreading so achieved should lower costs
for all. It has been arged that the government is needed to create such risk pools for
insurance purposes because it has more information than do individuals and can benefit
from scale economies of large-scale operation, as compared to private sector initiatives.
This may also characterize the market for nursing-home insurance: insurers only recently
have begun to offer long-term care policies, partly because the older population has not
fully recognized the high risk and high costs of such care. Here the argument is that the
government may be able to redistribute and/or internalize risks in ways that the private
sector cannot Similarly, small firms seeking to purchase health care insurance often find
that obtaining health coverage for a handful of employees is prohibitively expensive, or else
simply not possible if the workgroup is too small. This is because of insurers' fear that
risks cannot be adequately pooled over small groups, particularly if there is the possibility
for adverse selection on the part of prospective employees: Here again, the argument is
that the government can intervene when private markets fail to provide needed insurance.
A final motivation for government involvement in the benefits area is equity.
Current tax law permits high-wage workers to avoid paying income and payroll tax on
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benefits comprising a large component of their compensation, which conflicts with the
premise of progressive taxation. As noted earlier, many company contributions to health
and disability insurance plans are not taxed at all, while employer contributions to pension
plans are taxed only after retirement (generally at lower rates). Some argue that restoring
equity requires that the government intervene in the benefits area by mandating coverage of
cenain forms or types (for instance, benefits nondiscrimination requirements were justified
on grounds that they set rules which plans must follow in order to qualify for tax-free
status). Many economists contend that equity and efficiency would be better served by
taxing all forms of compensation similarly (Munnell, 1988), though real-world
policymakers may not have the political leeway to achieve a "first-best" solution to
efficiency and equity concerns.
What are the pros and cons of having the government mandate that firms
provide nonwage benefits?
Assuming that government intervention can be justified on the grounds just
discussed, the question remains as to who can most efficiently and fairly provide these
benefits to the relevant population. In other words, one must judge whether the advantages
of mandating that employers provide these benefits outweigh the costs of having them do
so, or whether some other entity might do it more effectively and in a less costly way.
Arguments in Favor of Employer Provision
Some analysts would contend argue that requiring firms to provide a specific
benefits package pennits tailoring of the offerings to employees' and firms' needs, while
still taking advantage of cost-savings due to group benefit purchase (Mitchell and Andrews,
1981).In contrast, if a government agency were to offer similar benefits, standardization
might limit the adaptation of benefits to specific employee and firm circumstances
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(Summers, 1988).An additional factor is that employers may also have better information
than governmental agencies regarding workers' risks, insurance costs, and benefits; this
might make employer-provided plans cheaper as a result of lesser moral hazard.
Several additional arguments have been offered in suppon of requiring that
employers offer mandated benefits. First, some political pragmatists argue that at present
there is no more direct way to extend benefit coverage to uncovered employees, in view of
current budget deficits. A second rationale recognizes that some benefits are already offered
voluntarily in the labor market, and it may be that requiring employers to offer a mandatory
benefits package could be less disruptive than would a government tax/transfer program
requiring the same general set of benefits. This is because at least the most immediate
impact of a mandate would be limited to workplaces where such benefits are not currently
offered. In addition, several commentators have noted that the political appeal of a mandate
rests on the assumption that putting the burden on company shoulders both preserves the
benefits providers market, and also keeps"big government" from growing even larger than
it already is (Pauly, 1988;Quayle, 1987).Offsetting this effect is the possibility that for
some, labor supply might actually increase under a mandated benefits approach. Empirical
evidence on this latter point appears in the next section.
Criciticms of Employer Provision
Though the arguments in favor of requiring that employers provide benefits are
numerous, there are also some imponant criticisms of such proposals which policymakers
must confront. Some analysts argue that any government intervention is per se coercive
and thus must be discouraged; others highlight government enforcement and administration
costs. Opponents of the mandated benefits idea have also emphasized equity problems
with the proposals: that is, people who do not currently hold jobs would not be helped by
mandated employee benefits, for the most pan.4 Certain employers would also be more
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affected than others: in particular, small fInns cUITemlyoffer fewer nonwage benefIts,
appear the most constrained by minimum wage laws, and probably face more competitive
constraints than their larger counterparts (Small Business Adminstration, various years).
In addition small fInns hire more women than do larger companies, so that some worry that
the indicidence of mandating benefIts might fall most heavily on groups others wish to
protect (Becker, 1988;Smith, 1988).
Objections raised on effIciency grounds are also worrisome. Mandating benefIts
raises labor costs for fIrms without benefIts, with eventual negative consequences for
wages and employment levels. Affected employers, seeking to pass on the increased labor
costs to their workers, will reduce wages (or wage growth) to offset new benefIt costs. In
some instances all that is required is that employers rearrange the components of
compensation moving away from cash toward more benefIts, and on net when this can be
done in a costless manner there will be relatively little impact on employment, product
prices and profItability. It should be noted that even in this instance, some employees'
wellbeing will decline when they would have prefeITedto receive cash wages over the
additional benefIts they are forced to consume with the benefit mandate. In other instances
employers will fInd it impossible to increase benefits by reducing cash pay, especially
where pay rates are constrained by the legal minimum wage. In these cases, requiring
higher benefits pushes up labor costs which in turn introduces incentives for affected finns
to alter their overall employment levels, curtailing labor usage and eventually reducing
production and raising consumer prices.
Fixed versus Variable Cost Benefits Packages
The precise manner in which employers respond must depend on how a given
policy mandate is structured. One way to frame a benefit mandate is to require that all
employees be provided with the same benefit package iITespectiveof whether that employee
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works pan- or full-time. In this case benefit takes on "fixed costs" characteristics; that is,
the employer must bear the same benefits cost irrespective of how many hours that
employee actually works. Fixed-cost benefits of this type increase low-wage workers'
compensation relatively more than highly-paid employees, so employers will tend to
substitute away from low-skilled toward high-skilled labor (Hamennesh, 1988). In
addition, those affected will utilize more hours per worker, and probably fewer total
worker hours overall (Ehrenberg, 1971;Han, 1984). How much the total number of
employees varies depends on finns' ability to substitute labor for capital and is not
theoretically detenninable.
The "fixed cost" approach to mandated benefits is not merely a hypothetical notion:
in fact, several mandatory health insurance bills discussed in Congress over the last two
years take exactly this fonn. Many of the plans required that a specified set of health care
items be provided: for example, one stipulated that employers offer health insurance
coverage for physician and hospital services, prenatal and maternity care, limited mental
health services, and catastrophic coverage limiting worker out of pocket expenses to
$3,000. These specific coverage requirements were to be combined with government-set
deductibles, co-payment rates, and exclusion restrictions. Another example of a "fIxed-
cost" viewpoint may be found in many of the parental leave bills before Congress.
Typically these bills entitle employees to 10 weeks leave during which health benefit
coverage must continue; this benefit is a per-worker entitlement rather than accruing by the
work hour.
An alternative method of structuring a mandated benefit proposes a "variable cost"
approach, tying benefit entitlements to hours of work rather than having them accrue on a
flat per-worker basis. Those who tout this idea note that a mandated benefits program
where benefits are tied to the number of hours worked would probably cost employers and
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society as a whole less, than would regulation mandating that all employees must be
provided with a common set of benefits (Bell and Hart, 1988;Summers, 1988). This
prediction assumes that a tax increase would be required to pay for the plan which in turn
would induce an across-the board reduction in labor supply. In contrast, under the
mandating approach, only the subset of newly covered workers would be immediately
affected.
Again, the variable cost approach is not merely hypothetical: a variant of it was
proposed by President Carter's Commission on Pension Policy when this body sought to
design a mandatory pension proposal over a decade ago. The plan called for a minimum of
3% of each worker's pay to be deposited into a defined contribution pension plan (or
something producing equivalent retirement income if it were a defined benefit plan).
In analyzing the likely effect of this and other variable cost mandate proposals, it
must be admitted that a portion of the cost increase would be passed on to workers in the
form of lower wages. In addition, job loss due to the the substitution and scale effects
described above would follow because of that portion of the benefit that could not be
passed on. On the other hand, the additional undesirable distributional consequences
inherent in a fixed-cost benefit would not apply. From this perspective, then, the variable-
cost method of assigning mandated benefits has a somewhat greater appeal on equity
grounds.S To take a concrete example, requiring employers to provide all workers with a
specified number of paid family leave days each year raises costs by a higher proponional
for low-paid workers than for higher-paid employees, which could induce shifting away
from the now more expensive group. A related case appeared in a recent anicle about
Brazil's decision to mandate maternity leave of four months for all employees. As a
consequence of this action, many women were "told they would not be hired because they
were pregnant and others...were warned they would loose their job in case of
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pregnancy...many employers had already signaled that they want to replace young women
with men" (Simons, 1988).
Allowing Small Firms To Remain Exempt or Provide Reduced Coverage
It becomes more difficult to predict the likely labor market consequences of
mandating either per-worker or variable benefits when ponions of the workforce are
exempted from the benefit mandate. In point of fact, however, real-world proposals usually
have a partial coverage feature because part-timers and/or workers in small finns are often
exempted (or may be covered by a somewhat less generous package). Hamermesh (1988)
finds that limiting a benefit mandate to a subsector of the economy produces strong
incentives for finns to contract out employment, hire temporaries, and otherwise replace
"protected" with "unprotected" workers. This could be a particular problem for the health
insurance bills currently under consideration which propose to cover only people employed
17.5 hours a week or more. In a parallel manner the proposed parental leave bills before
Congress are structured to include only firms with more than 35-50 employees.
Possible Labor Supply Responses
Not only does partial coverage affect demand for labor of different types --labor
supply too may be influenced. While establishing the size of the effect is primarily an
empirical question to be addressed below, it is wonh speculating about the likely direction
of the expected changes. Some predict that women may be less likely to leave their jobs
due to childbearing or might seek paid employment during childbearing years if maternity
leave were mandated. On the other hand quit rates and absenteeism patterns may change for
those newly covered by benefits, and in comparison to workers in the uncovered sector. In
general, thooretical analysts conclude that it is probably impossible to predict the complete
effect of a benefit mandate when these real-world and interesting extensions are
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incorporated (Hart, 1984). Empirical evidence is needed to explore whether these different
effects are sizeable.
Are Other Policy Goals Thwarted?
A final caution raised about mandating benefit plans is that this policy alters labor
costs across workers of different types, which may unexpectedly undermine other public
policy goals. For instance, employers required to offer a standard health insurance package
or parental leave policy might find it more expensive to employ women workers (Becker,
1988; Cook, 1989). This cost differential could induce some firms to substitute men for
women in employment. Similar selection problems could arise for low-income workers
where health problems may be perceived to be more likely. In contrast, a publicly funded
and operated program which provided the same benefits would spread benefit costs across
gender, health status, age, and other factors, removing employers' incentives to become
more selective in hiring and retention of now more costly workers.
Overview
In conclusion, there are many reasons to both favor and oppose proposals to have
the government intervene further in the employee benefits area, and the rationales differ
from case to case. In the case of health insurance, three arguments for government
intervention are emphasized in the literature: some people are uninsurable in the private
market; some people have insufficient income to buy private health insurance; and
externalities in medical care market appear to justify regulation. In contrast two arguments
are frequently offered to justify mandating parental leave: some say it is a 'merit good'
which all should receive, while others emphasize possible externalities (e.g. some say
children who do not 'bond' after childbirth may cause social problems later). When it
comes to pension provision, generally the argument is formulated as one where
government action is required because improvident workers undersave, or workers
16
overconsume due to insufficient infonnation about their retirement needs. Despite these
philosophical differences motivating those who favor mandating benefits of one kind or
other, all in favor of the policy seem united in a pragmatic stance, believing that large-scale
government provision of new benefits is not realistic in the current budget environment.
Those who oppose benefit mandating do so for very different reasons. Some analysts are
philosophically opposed, preferring as linle government intervention in the labor market as
possible, while others point out that employment-linked proposals of necessity leave
unprotected the several million currently out of the labor market who would not be helped
by a mandated employer-provided benefits plan.
III. Evidence on the Labor Market Consequences of Mandatin~ Emplovee
Benefits
Having identifiedthe key policyargumentsfor and againstgovernmentmandating
of employee benefits packages, we now move to an examination of empirical evidence on
the likely labor market consequences of mandated benefits. Rather than delving into
specific legislative proposals, we take a more general approach and refer the interested
reader to others' reviews of specific recent benefit proposals (See for instance Morgan,
1987; Meyer, 1988; Rix, 1987;US Congress, 1987;US General Accounting Office, 1988).
The discussion proceeds in two parts. First comes a review of evidence on the
likely impact of mandated benefits on compensation and employment. We focus on what
the empirical literature has to say on overall hours and employment level adjustments, and
the length of time such adjustments might be expected to take. Also noted are differential
adjustment patterns across sectors of the economy. Next, the discussion turns to an
assessment of evidence on workers' likely responses to mandated benefits. Here we focus
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on changes in labor supply, turnover behavior, and sorting patterns of workers across the
labor market.
Mandating Benefits: Consequences for Compensation Patterns and
Employment
Earlier we noted that economists believe dollars devoted to benefits come at the
expense of dollars that could otherwise go to wages. Hence the first set of empirical issues
to investigate in the mandated benefit context is: if the government mandates a new benefit,
what effect will this have on other elements of the compensation package? One literature
that might be thought helpful in answering this question examines tradeoffs between
different forms of compensation in the workplace. Nevertheless the studies in this genre
are often seriously limited by data and estimation problems. One careful study of the public
sector found a one-for-one tradeoff between wages and employer-provided benefits
(Ehrenberg and Smith, 1979). Taken literally, these results imply that mandating an
employee benefit package costing 10% would depress affected workers' pay by the same
amount. However private sector studies of wage!benefit tradeoffs tend to find no evidence
in support of the compensating differentials theory, and indeed most often report a positive
relationship between wage levels and benefits (Mitchell and Pozzebon, 1987; Smith and
Ehrenberg, 1983). The jury is still out on whether these generally negative results prove
that the theory is wrong, or that error-ridden data simply cannot be relied on to test the
hypothesis.
Other forms of adjustment in the compensation package besides employment loss
can occur. For instance a 1957 survey in New York state showed that raising retail stores'
labor costs for low-wage workers reduced a number of employee benefits including rest
and meal breaks, year-end bonuses, paid vacations, sick leave, store discount privileges,
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premium pay, and other compensation (Wessels, 1980). Precise response magnitudes for
this type of tradeoff have not yet been pinpointed, however.
A second line of inquiry on benefit/pay tradeoffs takes a different tack, comparing
benefit patterns in states which currently mandate particular benefits with those in states
which do not One such study is that of Trzcinski (1988), who examines whether private
sector workers are paid differently in states which mandate maternity leave policies as
compared to states which do not. Her results do not paint a consisten picture. In states
which treat maternity leave as a special medical disability, she finds that hourly wages for
women in small finns are depressed by 0 to 7%, and benefit coverage rates are lower by 0
to 11%. The upper-bound responses seem unbelievably large.6 She also concludes that
women's pay is apparently ,not depressed in states which treat pregnancy and childbinh
leave like other disability leaves. (Men's pay was not depressed in any of her results). The
author does not offer an explanation for the differential impact by type of benefit plan, but it
may be that different funding methods under the tWopolicies contribute to observed
differences. When pregnancy leave is fonnulated as a special disability program with
readily identifiable premiums tied to the number of women in a workplace, the funding
method will highlight additional costs of hiring women and exen downward pressure on
women's compensation and employment. In contrast, treating maternity leave as one of
many covered events in an overall disability policy induces more risk-pooling and probably
more cross-subsidization in premiums.7
In overview then, theoretical research on the paylbenefits tradeoff indicates that
mandating benefits will reduce compensation for some groups of workers in the long run.
Nevenheless the empirical evidence suggests that the full costs of mandated benefits may
not be immediately passed on to private sector workers via reductions in their wages and
benefits. In this event, mandating benefits increases employers' labor costs.
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Following this line of argument, the next question to be addressed is: if mandating
a new benefit raises labor costs, what happens to labor demand? The empiricallaoor
economics literature is of some help in assessing likely response magnitudes. Research
shows that there will probably be "only slight substitution away from workers and toward
hours, Jwlding total worker-Jwurs constant" (emphasis added, Hamermesh, 1988, p. 24;
see also Ehrenberg and Schumann, 1982). However overall labor demand in covered firms
will decline if there is not a one-for-one tradeoff between increased benefits and reduced
wages. In general, the literature suggests that when labor costs rise by 10%, overaUlabor
demand will fall by 1-5%, with most of the adjustment taking place within one year
(Hamermesh, 1988;Hart, 1988). Hence the econometric evidence implies that mandating
benefits will certainly reduce employment in covered firms, though the exact magnitude
depends on the cost increase embedded in any given benefit proposal.
As we have noted aoove, mandating benefits is likely to alter relative labor costs in
addition to overall labor costs. Consider, for instance, the effect of dramatic changes in
relative labor costs predicted in a recent assessment of a proposed mandatory health
insurance bill (US Congress, 1988). The bill would boost minimum wage workers' total
compensation by 15-20% as a result of imposing the mandatory health insurance plan, but
would have virtually no effect on higher-wage employees' cash income (most in the highly
paid group were assened to be already covered by a plan meeting the minimum standards).
A consequence of changing relative wages in this way would be to induce employers to
substitute away from low-wage employees toward more highly-skilled labor and capital.
Substitution is likely to be most feasible among lesser-skilled employees, many of whom
are minimum wage earners. Indeed, recent estimates show that teenagers, women, and
part-time employees comprise, respectively, 36%, 65%, and 66% of all minimum wage
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workers (Stout, 1988).These workers also tend to be concentrated in small rums and are
the least likely to have employee benefits (Small Business Administration, various years).
Studies in a related genre have also noted that low-wage employers may not be able
to pass on increased benefit costs when their employees are already at the minimum wage
floor. The likely impact in this instance would be reduced employment. From econometric
analyses of the minimum wage, we know that that raising pay by 10% among minimum
wage workers is associated with a 0.5 to 3% decline in youth employment (see Brown,
1988;Mitchell, 1982;Mitchell and Mikalauskas, 1988),so similar outcomes might be
anticipated if benefit mandates of this magnitude were implemented.
Other researchers have simulated the disemployment consequences of pay increases
using simulation models., :Whilethe models can be criticized on grounds on not
representing the "real world" in imponant ways, they do tend to suggest similar response
magnitudes as those unveiled in more conventional econometric studies. For example,
Anderson's simulation excercise (1988)points to 160,000 workers losing their jobs as a
result of mandating a 3% defined benefit pension; in subsequent years he finds the job loss
rate would taper to some 60,000 employees. Anderson also contends that over half of the
job loss would be concentrated in firms with fewer than 25 employees, and an additional
twenty percent in finns with between 25 and 99 workers. Others have evaluated
employment effects of benefit mandates without relying on specific simulation models.
Extrapolating from some of their other work, Karen Davis and Edward Gramlich both
testified before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources that a mandated
health insurance plan which raised low-wage workers pay by 15% would induce job losses
for around 100,000 workers. In each of these cases cited, the figures represent more-or-
less educated guesses since the assessments are only loosely linked to econometrically
robust models estimated with appropriate data. Nevertheless, the fact remains that policy
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researchers clearly do not believe that job losses would be zero as a result of a mandated
benefits plan. Whether disemployment effects are judged to be "large" or "small" depends,
of course, on the observer: as (then Senator) Quayle stated, "We may talk in terms of
100,000 jobs as not being a lot, but if you take 100,000 jobs of minority teenagers, that
population has suffered enough" (Quayle, 1987).
For reasons of political feasibility, mandated benefits proposals such as the health
benefits or parental leave policies described above often exempt some portion of the labor
market from coverage, on the argument that cost increases are simply too great for some
employees and firms to bear. For this reason, small businesses are frequently allowed to
avoid participating or in some cases the benefits they must offer are permitted to be less
comprehensive than those required of larger firms. Along the same lines, some reform
bills suggest that benefits need not be provided to part-time employees at all, or in lesser
amounts. Unfortunately in practice the definition of a "small" fum or a "part-time
employee" appears to change from one version of a bill to the next without much attention
to how benefit costs and disemployment patterns might vary. The end result, though, is
the same: these exemptions have the effect of mandating benefit coverage across only
portions of the labor market.
Mandating Benefits: Consequences for Labor Supply
Thus far the discussionhas emphasizedemployers'likely responses to increases in
labor costs due to mandated benefits. However there is a reasonable chance that workers
also might alter their behavior if firms are required to provide health insurance, family
leave coverage, or other benefits. Several different dimensions of labor supply response
should be considered, though they are rarely (if ever) brought up in policy evaluations.
22
Increases in absenteeism may be one undesireable effect of devoting a larger
fraction of compensation to benefits. This is particularly true when benefit entitlements
accrue on a per-worker fixed-cost basis and the value of the entitlement is not affected by a
few additional absences from work. Research shows, for instance, that being eligible for
sick leave increases workers' absenteeism rates (Allen, 1981;Ehrenberg et al., 1989;
Winkler, 1980). Hence cost estimates of proposed family and medical leave plans which
assume constant worker abseentism are probably too optimistic: allowing workers to take a
given number of family and medical leave days per year will probably increase absenteeism
and should be included in cost forecasts. A similar prediction follows for mandated health
benefits, though here the effect is more subtle. Increasing workers' total income by
imposing a mandated health plan makes workers better off if wage cuts do not fully offset
the new benefit. This produces an income effect inducing them to work less, without
materially altering the cost of not working (wages foregone). The end result will be more
absenteeism (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1988). On the other hand programs which tie benefit
accrual to work time, using a variable benefit format, would have fewer incentives in this
direction.
A different labor supply response to mandated benefits must also be examined:
turnover. Benefits are frequently structured in such a way to discourage quits and tie
workers to their jobs; for instance vesting and other rules make it costly to leave an
employer if a worker is covered by a pension (Mitchell, 1982), while waiting periods and
exclusion rules probably have a similar effect in the area of health insurance. Changing
jobs would become much easier and probably more prevalent if health coverage were made
mandatory and if, as some of the proposals were formulated, waiting periods and
exclusions for pre-existing conditions were prohibited. However a rise in turnover brings
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with it higher search, recruitment and training costs, which in tum reduces net labor
productivity and output. In other words, an overall decline in output and labor productivity
would be a worrisome possibility if mandated benefits prohibited employers from using
benefits to discourage job changing, now pennitted in existing benefit plans.
Studies show that such partial coverage patterns will induce movements of workers
from covered sector jobs to jobs without mandated benefits. Specifically, evidence from the
US and several European countries indicate that increases in non-wage costs among "first-
tier" workers contributed to more employment in the uncovered "second-tier", including
temporary help, pan-timers and subcontracted workers (Ehrenberg, Rosenberg and Li,
1988;Hamennesh, 1988; Mangum, Mayall and Nelson, 1985). Expansion of the uncovered
sector is troubling in light of the fact that one important motivation for mandating benefits is
to reach workers currently lacking such coverage. As yet there are no hard estimates of the
likely growth in the uncovered sector given an increase in labor costs in the covered sector,
which probably explains why policy studies to date have not accounted for these in any
scientific way. What seems clear, however, is that workers in the "second tier" sector are
significantly less likely to be covered by employee benefits of all kinds (Williams, 1989).
Hence the possibility remains that mandating benefits might not increase benefit coverage
among low-wage workers, if this combination of effects is large enough.
There is yet a different way that mandated benefits can and will affect labor supply.
Specifically, the chance to qualify for benefit coverage will induce some people to enter the
labor force and to remain employed beyond the point they might have otherwise. This is
especially probable for new mothers receiving continuation .of health care coverage and job
reinstatement under the family and medical leave plan, who might have left their jobs (or
perhaps been discharged) prior to the refonn. While response magnitudes to these
particular bills are not known, results from other benefits programs are infonnative. One
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study pertinent to this issue demonstrated that raising unemployment insurance payments
by 20% increased the fraction of women working by about 1% and women's work hours
grew by about 12%. The latter is an entitlement effect: women worked longer so as to meet
the minimum income level for unemployment program coverage (Hamermesh, 1979).A
related study by Ehrenberg, Rosenberg and Li (1988)also concluded that "supply side
responses exceed demand responses" when part-time compensation was raised in the
United States over time. In consequence, it must be concluded that coverage-induced
increases in labor supply are very likely among groups of people who previously were not
offered benefit coverage. Designers of mandated benefits packages must recognize such
downward pressure on pay attributable to the supply-side responses, since as we showed
above, these tend to be low-wage low-skilled workers.
A final labor supply response to mandated benefits worthy of consideration here is
an issue that arises because workers and fIrms differ in their valuation of benefits packages.
If the government mandates that a fixed-cost benefit be provided to a portion of the labor
force, yet workers differ in the way they value it, those valuing the benefit least will tend to
move to jobs exempted from the mandate. Evidence of this is offered by Scott, Berger and
Black (1989),who warn that "enactment of this legislation would increase the amount of
labor market segmentation faced by low-income workers" (p.228). Unfortunately likely
response magnitudes cannot be computed from the numbers given in that study.
Despite the importance of supply-side responses, few policy analysts have
recognized them when discussing the potential consequences of mandating benefits. This
is certainly an area where more research would be valuable. Inevitably, those interested in
labor market efficiency must be troubled by the finding that mandated benefits probably
increase absenteeism and tUrnover. Those focusing on equity would, in addition, be
concerned about likely increases in labor supply due to mandated benefits, which have the
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beneficial effect of tying low-wage workers to the market more closely, but also of driving
down this group's wages. In addition, it appears that mandating a fixed-cost benefit would
probably have the largest supply-side effects, while allocating benefits on a variable per-
hour worked basis might well have smaller labor supply consequences.
IV. Conclusions and Policy Alternatives
Conclusions
This paper identifies and, where possible, quantifies potential labor market
consequences of government mandates of employee benefits. Policy analysts should
consider two questions when contemplating mandated benefits: (I) What relative
imponance should be attached to those who gain under the mandate versus those who lose?
(2) Could feasible alternative policies have more beneficial outcomes? Existing policy
research suggests the following conclusions:
.Mandating benefits will increase benefit coverage and generosity for numerous
workers and their families. Nevertheless, many people lacking insurance coverage will not
be helped by this type of mandated employee benefit program.
. Even when mandating benefits does improve benefit provision, there will be
offsetting effects. These include wage and other benefit cuts, reduced work hours,reduced
employment, and possibly output reductions in covered sectors. Employer bias against
"expensive to insure" workers may also result, producing labor market sorting and
segmentation.
. Most workers currently without benefit coverage are employees of small finns,
women, pan-time and minimum wage workers. Nevenheless, most mandated benefit
proposals exclude or reduce coverage for these workers to alleviate the financial burden on
small fl1l11s.
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Policy Recommendations
Policy analysts evaluating any labor market policy, including the proposal under
scrutiny to mandate benefits, should consider and respond to two key questions: (1) What
relative importance should be attached to those who gain versus those who lose when a
new policy is implemented?; and (2) Could alternative (feasible) policies have more
beneficial outcomes?
While a full discussion of these questions in the present context goes outside the
purview of this paper, it should be emphasized that deciding whether or not to mandate a
given benefit or set of benefits requires the analyst to evaluate and weigh increases in
wellbeing afforded to workers (and their families) that would be newly covered by such a
mandated benefit, with the-pay and the employment cuts borne by the less fonunate. In
addition it must be asked what other feasible alternative policy scenarios might be if
Congress did not mandate benefits. An option popular with some would be to keep the
status quo, lening the market generate its continuing uneven pattern of voluntarily-provided
benefits. Others concerned about gaps in insurance coverage instead advocate a greatly
expanded government role in the health and pension field supponed by taxes and providing
benefits for the population at large.8 Alternatively Congress might take a middle road
offering incentives such as tax subsidies for employers who expand benefit coverage,
without directly mandating additional specific benefits. While this last approach has the
vinue of encouraging insurance coverage among employees, it would not help those
without jobs. It does seem that proposals which cost the Treasury will be sternly regarded
in this era of "no new taxes".
Given that mandating employer-provided benefits remains a viable option after
having done this broader analysis, it remains true that mandates raise labor costs and
produce job losses which will probably be concentrated among low-wage workers in
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smaller finns. However there may be ways to design a mandated benefit so as to reduce
these negative effects somewhat. We have argued above that the variable-cost approach --
requiring that benefits accrue at a percentage rate per worker-hour -- has the advantage of
reducing the bias against low-wage employees currently without coverage. In contrast, the
fixed-cost approach such as that inherent in most current health and family leave proposals
makes low-wage workers and the finns that employ them proponionately much more
vulnerable to the negative consequences of cost increases. On the other hand, some critics
would suggest that a variable-cost approach in the health insurance area would not insure
all workers' access to basic and major medical insurance at affordable rates. Similarly,
variable-cost pension contributions would not ensure high levels of retirement income for
pan-time or pan-week workers, and along the same lines, pro-rated family leaves would
not ensure that aUemployees get ample paid time off with infants or sick children. Hence
those concerned with providing a basic level of social insurance might judge the fixed-cost
approach preferable even with its greater potential for more severe disemployment effects
among panicular sectors of the economy.
Based on the analysis above, the following recommendations are offered:
.While mandating benefits using a fixed-cost structure is viewed positively by
some, it raises labor costs most for low-wage workers, inducing substitution away from
them toward more skilled employees. Fixed-cost benefits also reduce flexibility in
designing benefit packages and are not responsive to worker and fInn differences in the
demand for benefits. In contrast, a variable-cost fonnat where benefits accrue according to
hours worked somewhat mitigates these drawbacks.
.Many finns claim they require tax incentives to help them provide benefit
coverage. If tax incentives become necessary for political reasons, they should be paired
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with a cap on the overall fraction of payroIJ that can be used for tax-shielded employee
benefit contributions. This would make the tax and the benefit system more equitable as a
whole.
. If government decides to mandate more employee benefits, a gradual approach
should be taken. Each element of a target mandated benefit package should be ranked in a
priority list and justified on both efficiency and equity grounds. Subsequently, after the
labor market consequences of one such benefit are evaluated, additional benefit mandates
might be considered.
. A separate approach should be designed to meet the needs of those not covered
by employer-provided benefit programs.
Remaining Research Questions
Severalquestionsshouldbe addressedin future researchif policy analysis is to be
useful in guiding decisions on mandatory employee benefits packages. We need to know
more about why workers differ in their demand for benefits, and why some firms supply
benefits of particular types and levels of coverage while others do not. Only armed with
this information will be be possible to understand why voluntarily provided benefits are so
unevenly distributed across the labor market.
More research should also be done on the labor market impact of state-level
regulations regarding the form and content of benefits. Additional analysis would also be
useful on different ways to structure benefits, following up on the variable versus the
fixed-cost format. Last but not least, more research is required on the extent to which the
low-wage population regards public sources of insurance as a good substitute for
private/employer-provided benefits.
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To understand these and other important questions in the benefits arena, the
research community needs new and improved datasets containing infonnation on both
workers and their employers, as well as detail on their wage and benefit compensation
packages. In addition, longitudinal surveys on worker consumption of and perceptions of
insurance would be most valuable.
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1Space constraints prevent a discussion of benefits offered to the elderly, such as retiree
health insurance benefits.
2This is true as long as the employer-provided plans meet nondiscrimination requirements;
see Beam and McFadden (1988).
3Some of the demand for insurance programs among low-wage workers may be met by
social insurance programs. On the other hand it is known that many low-income
individuals are ineligible fqr Medicaid, and those out of the labor force cannot receive
Social Security. See Chollet (1988).
4The size of the uncovered population depends on the benefit in question. See Chollet
(1988), Andrews (1989), and EBRI (1988).
50f course in practice, mandated benefit proposals often have both variable and fixed
elements.
6A four to five month maternity leave for a woman having two children would probably
cost an employer no more than 3% of her lifetime earnings if the woman remained with that
employer twenty years (without even taking discounting into effect). Hence the author's
upper bound wage responses seem unbelievably large.
7The fact that funding policies matter in the mandated benefit context is also emphasized in
some interesting work by Jensen and Gabel (1988)and Jensen, Morrissey and Marcus
31
(1987). They fmd growing self-insurance of employer-provided health benefits plans; one
explanation is that that fIrms self-insure to avoid state mandates of coverage for specific
services including alcoholism, drug and mental health treatment, and chiropractors when
they self-insure. An additional explanation for this pattern is that self-insured fIrms are not
required to participate in state risk pools covering people who cannot buy insurance on their
own.
8A nationally funded and operated health plan would reduce incentives to select against
'expensive' employees, and reduces labor market segmentation due to employee sorting.
Specific suggestions to expand the role of Medicaid for the medically needy uninsured
population are discussed and evaluated by Chollet (1988)and Meyer (1988).
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